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Corporate Transparency and the Impact of Investor Sentiment on Stock Prices 
1. Introduction 
 Recent research has documented that investor sentiment plays an important role in explaining asset 
prices (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006, Das and Chen 2007, Seybert and Yang 2012, Stambaugh et 
al. 2012, Cen et al. 2013). The sentiment effect varies across firms and may depend on ‘noise trader risk’ 
(Lee et al. 1991, Kumar and Lee 2006) and on the operating and financial characteristics of the firms. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) argue that some firms are more difficult to value using fundamental 
factors and are therefore more sensitive to sentiment effects. At the empirical level, they show that firms 
whose valuations are highly subjective, for example, those that are small, young, unprofitable, risky, high 
growth, and distressed, are more susceptible to sentiment effects. We note here, however, that Baker and 
Wurgler’s study was based on U.S. firms, which have relatively uniform and high quality reporting and 
disclosure standards when compared to firms in emerging markets. 
 In this study, we extend the literature by investigating how corporate transparency, broadly defined as 
the extent to which firm specific information is credibly disclosed to market participants (Bushman et al. 
2004), is related to investor sentiment effects in financial markets. Low corporate transparency reduces 
the supply of accurate firm-specific information and heightens information asymmetry between firms and 
external investors. Such an information environment restricts the ability of outside investors to make 
accurate assessments of the valuation parameters that underlie stock price formation. Having less reliable 
information to count on in their decision-making makes investors and other market participants rely more 
on subjective judgments and results in a greater reliance on general investment sentiment. To date, 
however, the impact of corporate transparency on investor sentiment has not been examined empirically. 
 Another way in which we extend the prior literature is that we use data from the world’s largest 
emerging and transitional economy, namely, China. Research on investor sentiment has hitherto focused 
on developed and highly regulated markets such as the U.S. and the United Kingdom (e.g., Baker and 
Wurgler 2006, Seybert and Yang 2012, Gemmill and Thomas 2002). In contrast, there is little evidence 
available for emerging markets, which are vastly different from developed markets in terms of return 
volatility, ownership structure, investor protection, and corporate governance (Bekaert and Harvey 1997, 
Lemmon and Lins 2003, Leuz et al. 2003). These differences will affect firm equity valuation and are 
very likely to result in different sources and different patterns of sentiment-driven price movements from 
those documented in developed markets. For example, with respect to market participants, the Chinese 
stock market is dominated by individual investors (Ng and Wu 2006) and short selling and margin trading 
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are prohibited, which restricts the abilities of arbitrageurs to take advantage of mispricing1 (Sharif et al. 
2012). All of these characteristics contrast sharply with developed markets where large and active 
institutional investors dominate stock trading and where short sales and margin trading enables quicker 
price discovery (Pekarek and Meseha 2011). Furthermore, having a limited stock market history and 
having few or no experiences of market downturns may make investors more prone to optimism, which in 
turn fuels valuation bubbles (e.g., Barber and Odean 2008, 2009, Greenwood and Nagel 2009). Thus, 
investigating investor sentiment effects in the context of emerging markets provides an important addition 
to the literature.  
China’s stock market offers a particularly useful testing ground for the investigation of the influences 
of corporate transparency on investor sentiment effects. Since its inception in 1991, the Chinese stock 
market has grown exponentially to become the second largest in the world (after the United States)2. 
While China has enacted property rights laws and introduced accounting, disclosure, and governance 
regulations that mirror those in the U.S. and other well-established markets, the enforcement of these 
laws, rules, and regulations is often very lax and capricious. As a consequence of this, there are 
substantial variations across firms in terms of transparency (Piotroski and Wong 2011). This variation in 
disclosure quality across firms allows us to test our arguments. 
The combinations of highly variable corporate transparency with limited arbitrage opportunities (no 
short selling and no margin trading) and the dominance of individual investors are likely to greatly 
amplify sentiment influences in China’s capital markets. Importantly for our research, China’s stock 
market operates under capital controls where domestic (foreign) investors are allowed to invest in 
overseas (domestic) markets only after obtaining a quota from the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchanges through the highly restrictive channels of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Scheme 
(Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors Scheme). As at the end of 2010, the total approved amount of 
quotas for foreign (domestic investors) was U.S.$19.72 billion (U.S.$68.36 billion), which accounted for 
                                                 
1 China announced in January 2010 that a pilot scheme would be launched in March to lift the bans on 
short-selling and margin-trading for a designated list of stocks listed on China’s two stock exchanges. 
Specifically, 90 constituent stocks on a designated list were eligible for margin-trading and short-selling. 
This list was revised twice in July 2010, with six stocks being deleted and six new stocks being added. In 
December, 2011, the exchanges expanded the list to include 278 qualified constituent stocks as well as 7 
exchange-traded-funds (ETFs). We end our sample period before this reform in order to mitigate the 
influences associated with changing constraints on short-selling in the stock market. 
2 As of the end of 2010, the number of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies is 2,063, with a total 
market value of U.S. $4.76 trillion. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_84o9PPPGqk  
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only 0.4% (1.44%) of the total market capitalization of all stocks3. As a result of these restrictions, 
China’s financial market is characterized by a low degree of openness and the stock market is to a very 
large extent isolated from other stock markets. According to Chinn and Ito (2008), China is ranked 165 
out of 181 countries in the financial openness index, where rank 1 is the most open. The closed nature of 
China’s stock market offers a relatively clean setting to study the shifts in domestic market sentiments 
without yielding to concerns about sentiment contagion from other markets (Baker et al. 2012). 
 We measure corporate transparency in five different ways. We use three variables that have been 
extensively used in previous research to capture the quality of firm-specific financial information, namely, 
earnings management, auditor quality, and audit opinions (Hutton et al. 2009, Fan and Wong 2005, Choi 
and Jeter 1992). We also include two variables that are particularly germane to Chinese firms (and to 
firms in other transitional economies): related-party transactions (RPTs) and state ownership of firms. 
Importantly for our study, both of these factors have been shown to be associated with the degree of firm-
level information opacity in previous studies (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010, Jiang et al. 2010). 
To measure investor sentiment, we follow the general approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and 
construct an aggregate measure of investor sentiment from seven variables, namely, closed-end fund 
discounts, market turnover, the number of IPOs, IPO first-day returns, the share of equity issues in new 
financing, the growth of investment accounts, and the growth of savings deposits. We show that our 
sentiment index is negatively related to subsequent market returns starting from 5 months after and the 
relation becomes significant at 12 months onwards and thus is consistent with the existence of sentiment 
effects in the market.  
The cross-sectional contemporaneous patterns of sentiment-driven mispricing are difficult to identify 
directly and so our empirical tests concentrate on the long-run effects of sentiment on stock returns. 
Specifically, we focus on the time horizons of 9 months, 12 months, and 15 months. We find that 
sentiment effects are significantly greater for firms with more earnings management or that receive non-
clean audit opinions (i.e., qualified, negative, or disclaimer opinions) and are less significant for firms that 
are audited by Big 4 CPA firms. Firms that have more complex RPT activity are more affected by shifts in 
sentiment than are firms with less complex RPTs. Furthermore, state-controlled listed firms are more 
affected by sentiment than are privately controlled firms. Our results consistently suggest that greater 
firm-level transparency is significantly associated with lower sentiment impacts on stock prices. To the 
extent that China is similar to other emerging and transitional economies, we believe our finding that low 
transparency firms are more susceptible to investor sentiment will have resonance in these other 
countries. 
                                                 
3 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/china-funds-idUSL3E7EU0MF20110330 
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 Our overall findings that lower corporate transparency is associated with greater levels of sentiment 
effects on stock prices complement the findings in the extant sentiment literature. While prior studies 
generally focus on the noise trader behavior or valuation subjectivity as reflected in a firm’s 
fundamentals, we provide evidence that suggests that firm-specific transparency can also help explain the 
extent of a firm’s exposure to the sentiment factor. A direct implication of our study is that corporate 
governance reforms that enhance firm-level transparency can contribute to stock market efficiency 
through mitigating the influence of subjective forces on the pricing of a firm’s shares. Noise in stock 
prices engendered by sentiment can hinder the ability of corporations to use stock-based compensation 
schemes as a motivational and incentive-alignment tool. Sentiment can also adversely affect a 
corporation’s ability to obtain financial resources from capital markets because stock price noise can 
render the estimation of costs of capital difficult. This can lead to distortions and inefficiencies in capital 
investments. Our findings on the relations between corporate transparency and investor sentiment effects 
suggest that corporate management can mitigate the fluctuations in their firms’ stock prices by improving 
disclosure policies and corporate communications with investors.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Sentiment Effects: Business Uncertainties or Corporate Transparency? 
 Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that firms that are difficult to value are more susceptible to investor 
sentiment. There are two main reasons why a firm may be difficult to value. One reason relates to 
fundamental factors that encompass the uncertainties surrounding a firm’s business activities and its 
operating environment. Fundamental factors are explored by Baker and Wurgler using data from U.S. 
firms. They find that small, young, risky, loss, high growth, and distressed firms are more difficult to 
value. Consistent with the arguments about difficult-to-value firms, Hribar and McInnis (2012) show that 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings are less accurate for these types of firms. 
 Another major reason why firms are difficult to value is because of a lack of corporate 
transparency. Bushman et al. (2004) argue that corporate transparency is an outcome of a multifactor 
system that includes the quality of reporting standards and the intensity of private information 
acquisition and dissemination A large body of research has shown that corporate transparency in 
emerging markets such as China tend to be low due to the countries’ weak legal framework, 
unsophisticated financial intermediary sector, and restricted public and media press freedom (Piotroski 
and Wong 2011, Bushman et al. 2004, Ball et al. 2000). Furthermore, Durnev and Kim (2005) show 
that the variations in corporate disclosure is greater in financial markets with lower investor protection, 
because some firms may deliberately obscure their disclosures for nefarious reasons such as hiding 
losses or expropriation activities (Firth et al. 2011), while other firms may voluntarily disclose more 
information to signal their good quality and to correct mispricing. We argue that the lack of corporate 
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transparency presents a source of valuation difficulties for outside investors in emerging markets 
because they do not have sufficient and reliable information to evaluate the business fundamentals of 
publicly listed firms. We further argue that such valuation difficulties will amplify the investor 
sentiment effects in emerging financial markets. .   
 Theoretically, the difficulties involved in valuing the assets of a company are a function of its 
business uncertainties as well as its corporate transparency. In developed financial markets such as the 
U.S. where corporate transparency tends to be high and relatively uniform across firms, the valuation 
difficulties stem mainly from business uncertainties. However, corporate transparency may become the 
most significant source of valuation difficulties in emerging markets where investors do not have 
sufficient and reliable firm-specific information. Under this situation, the firm characteristics studied by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) may be subdued and may not have the same implications for sentiment effects 
as they do in mature markets. For example, when investors are not equipped with sufficient firm-specific 
information, valuing large firms should be more difficult than valuing small firms because large firms 
inherently engage in more intra-firm transactions, operate in a larger number of business and market 
segments, and have more organizational complexity (Williamson 1967, Ranger-Moore 1997, Dewenter et 
al. 2001). As a result, large firms rather than small firms may be associated with stronger sentiment 
effects. Similarly, profitable firms may be more difficult to value than loss-making firms in the emerging 
markets because profitable firms in these markets tend to face higher governmental expropriation risks 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986) and consequently have a greater incentive to reduce their level of corporate 
transparency in order to “mitigate the risk of governmental expropriation” (Durnev et al. 2009, p.1534) 
To gain some insight into which reason for sentiment effects is the most important in China, we first 
replicate the work of Baker and Wurgler (2006) using data from Chinese listed firms. Our results are not 
significant or have signs that are opposite to those in Baker and Wurgler (2006), except for return 
volatility.4 For example, we find that the stock returns of large firms are more affected by sentiment. This 
is opposite to the findings for U.S. firms but is consistent with our corporate transparency perspective. 
Prior literature suggests that return volatility is associated with firm fundamental risk such as earnings 
growth (Xu and Malkiel 2003, Wei and Zhang 2006) as well as corporate transparency measures such as 
financial reporting quality (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2011). Valuation difficulties, regardless of 
source, will result in greater return volatility. Therefore, the results on return volatility are consistent with 
both the business uncertainty and transparency perspectives. Overall, business uncertainties as suggested 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006) do not explain the empirical results of sentiment effects in China. Therefore, 
we turn our attention to corporate transparency to explain cross-section sentiment effects.  
                                                 
4 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.  
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2.2. Corporate Transparency and Investors’ Reliance on Sentiment  
2.2.1. Quality of Financial Information. Many listed Chinese firms provide only the minimum level of 
disclosures mandated by the regulator, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), and 
they seldom release voluntary, firm-specific information prior to the release of the annual report (Haw et 
al. 2005). Even though the quantity of financial information disclosures has improved following the 
recent adoptions of international accounting standards and disclosure rules, investors still have 
reservations about the quality of the reported numbers because earnings management practices are 
prevalent among Chinese listed firms (Aharony et al. 2000, Chen and Yuan, 2004, Firth et al. 2011). 
Hutton et al. (2009) argue that aggressive earnings management can measure management’s general 
proclivity to hide information from the capital market. Following these studies, we use accruals 
management as a measure of financial information quality (opacity). We expect that firms with more 
extensive accruals management are associated with a lower level of corporate transparency, which in turn 
makes the stocks more sensitive to shifts in investor sentiment. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
H1. Firms with greater accruals management (i.e., are more opaque) are more affected by investor 
sentiment than are firms with lesser accruals management.  
  The quality and reliability of accounting information can be improved if there is an independent and 
reliable auditor (Fan and Wong 2005). Since DeFond et al. (1999) suggest that Big 5 (now Big 4) auditors 
have a market advantage over local Chinese auditors among the clientele that demand high-quality audits, 
we therefore use the international Big 4 audit firms as another proxy for firms with high-quality 
accounting information and argue that employing Big 4 auditors can mitigate a firm’s sensitivity to 
sentiment. Our second hypothesis follows. 
H2. Firms audited by an international Big 4 CPA are less affected by investor sentiment than are firms 
audited by local CPAs. 
If auditors serve as external and independent monitors and take into account the audit risks associated 
with fraud, managerial entrenchment, political interference, and potential earnings manipulation, they will 
be more likely to give modified opinions to firms with problematic financial statements. Choi and Jeter 
(1992) find that a qualified audit opinion reduces the stock market’s responsiveness to the subsequent 
earnings announcements of the firm. Their findings suggest that a qualified audit opinion signifies to the 
market that there is an increase in the level of uncertainty, or noise, in the firm’s present and future 
earnings numbers and this constrains the market’s ability to make inferences about the firm’s future cash 
flows from accounting information. We therefore use a non-clean audit opinion as a third proxy of 
financial information opacity. Our hypothesis is as follows. 
H3. Firms with non-clean audit opinions (i.e., qualified, negative, or disclaimer) are more affected by 
investor sentiment than are a control group with unqualified audit opinions.   
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2.2.2. Complexity of Related Party Transactions (CRPTs). RPTs, defined as any transaction between a 
company or any of its subsidiaries and a connected party, are widespread among listed firms in China. 
Peng et al. (2011) show that out of 719 listed firms in 1997, 609 firms (84.6%) were involved to different 
degrees in related party transactions. In 2000, the percentage of firms with RPTs reached 93.2%. Initially, 
the primary reason for the prevalence of RPTs is that many listed firms in China are spin-offs or carve-
outs from a much larger SOE. After the IPO, most of the listed firms serve as the nexus of a large business 
group structured with multiple layers and with many firms in each layer, and they frequently engage in 
RPTs with other group members (Deng et al. 2012). However, in later years, many privately owned firms 
have listed on China’s stock exchanges. These privately owned listed firms are often part of a wide web 
of firms controlled by the dominant private shareholders and they engage in extensive RPT activities.  
There are two main reasons why firms that engage in more complex RPT activity tend to be less 
transparent than those with less complex RPT activity. First, prices used in RPTs are not necessarily based 
on the fair value principle (Lo et al. 2010) and rely less on accounting-based contracts for enforcement 
purposes. Second, RPTs in China and other financial markets have been used as a vehicle to expropriate 
minority shareholders as well as a vehicle for transferring valuable resources into the publicly listed firms 
(Cheung et al. 2006, Deng et al. 2012, Jian and Wong 2010). Without sufficient disclosure, it is difficult 
and costly for outside investors to understand the impact of RPTs on firm value. Furthermore, investors 
with limited cognitive ability may rely more on heuristics to evaluate firms with highly complex RPTs, 
which leads to stock prices being more sensitive to investor sentiment. As a result of this, we expect that 
firms with more complex related party transactions will be more affected by investor sentiment.5 This 
leads to our fourth hypothesis. 
H4. Firms with more complex related party transactions are more affected by investor sentiment than are 
those with less complex related party transactions. 
2.2.3. State Ownership  
There are two reasons why SOEs tend to have a less transparent information environment than those of 
private firms. Firstly, SOEs tend to have lower managerial-based and market-based incentives to provide 
                                                 
5  We argue that RPTs increase corporate opacity because they have a bidirectional impact on firm value 
(tunneling or propping) as opposed to only serving as a device for tunneling (agency costs). Theoretically, 
well-defined agency costs tend to reduce firm value (Fama and Jensen 1983), rather than directly increase 
firm valuation difficulties. In order to verify whether it is agency costs that drive our results we run the 
same tests with three commonly used measures of agency costs, namely, the share ownership of 
management, the share ownership of the controlling shareholder, and leverage. However, our results show 
no evidence that agency costs are significantly associated with sentiment effects. 
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credible accounting information to the markets than do private firms (Ball et al. 2000, Bushman et al. 
2004). Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that state owners rely on private information channels and their 
political networks, instead of accounting and stock price information, to measure and evaluate firm and 
manager performance. Furthermore, SOEs are usually favored by government when it comes to gaining 
access to finance and business opportunities, which further reduces the need for SOEs to provide credible 
financial reports (Firth et al. 2009).  
Secondly, the operations of SOEs are influenced not only by a grabbing hand where governments 
tend to use corporate resources to serve political and social objectives but also a helping hand where 
governments tend to grant favorable access to finance and preferential business opportunities to their 
favored SOEs (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). The argument here is similar to that for RPTs; the major owner 
has a bidirectional influence on corporate value and this create uncertainties for outsider investors.  
The proposition that state-controlled listed firms are less transparent is backed by recent empirical 
evidence. In a cross-country study, Bushman et al. (2004) find that corporate transparency is lower in 
countries where state ownership of enterprises and banks is higher. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find 
that firms with strong political connections have lower corporate transparency. Piotroski et al. (2013), 
document that SOEs in China have a higher incentive to suppress negative financial information than do 
privately controlled firms. Based on the aforementioned arguments and studies, we hypothesize that state-
controlled listed firms are more affected by investor sentiment due to their low corporate transparency. 
This leads to our fifth hypothesis. 
H5. State-controlled listed firms (SOEs) are more affected by investor sentiment than are privately 
controlled firms.  
3. Constructing the Sentiment Index  
 Unlike financial market activities and corporate events, investor sentiment is a perception-based 
construct that is inherently difficult to measure. Baker and Wurgler (2006) designed a sentiment measure 
using principal component analysis based on six financial variables, namely, closed-end fund discounts, 
market turnover, the number of IPOs, IPO first-day return, the share of equity issues in total equity and 
debt issues, and dividend premium. In this paper, we follow the Baker and Wurgler approach and 
construct a monthly investor sentiment index in China during the period from January 1999 to December 
2009. 
3.1. Developing a Sentiment Index for the Chinese Stock Market 
 We develop a composite sentiment index based on the common variation in seven underlying 
proxies for sentiment: the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), market turnover (TURN), the number of 
IPOs and their average first-day stock returns (NIPO and RIPO), the proportion of equity issues in the 
total issue of equity and long-term debt (Eshare), the deposit savings growth rate (DSG), and the number 
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of new investment accounts (NACT). The first five variables are constructed in the same way as reported 
in Baker and Wurgler (2006). CEFD is constructed as the value-weighted average of the difference 
between the market prices of closed-end fund shares and their net asset value per share, divided by the net 
asset value per share. TURN is defined as the natural log of the ratio of monthly market trading volume to 
the aggregate market value, detrended by the five-month moving average. NIPO and RIPO refer to the 
number of IPOs and the average market-adjusted first-day returns, respectively. We use the proportion of 
new equity issuance to total capital raised in a year (Eshare). Specifically, Eshare is defined as the ratio of 
equity issues to total equity issues and bank borrowing.6  
In addition to the above factors that were identified and used in Baker and Wurgler (2006), we also 
use the growth of deposit savings and the number of new investment accounts to capture investor 
sentiment in China’s stock market. Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) measure 
sentiment using mutual fund flows, which reflect individual retail investors’ reallocation of their money 
across different investment alternatives. Analogous to their studies, we use the rate of deposit savings 
growth to gauge investor sentiment in China. Due to the underdeveloped nature of financial markets and 
capital controls in China, local investors shift their money mostly between banks and equity markets. 
When they became more enamored with the stock market, they aggressively substitute away from their 
traditional concentration in savings accounts. Burdekin and Redfern (2009) find that rising stock market 
sentiment exerted a statistically significant negative effect on China’s time deposit growth during 2003-
2007, which corroborates our argument. The same authors show that the growth of money supply (M0) is 
also significantly associated with the growth of deposit savings and so we account for this factor in our 
calculations. In particular, we define the deposit savings growth (DSG) as the residual from a regression 
of the growth of seasonally-adjusted deposit savings on the growth rate of M0. 
We also use the number of new investors who open trading accounts for the first time as an additional 
component of sentiment. Compared with developed markets, China has a young market with net new 
investors entering the stock market during the past decade. Since new investors have few or no prior 
investment experiences, their participation and investment choice decisions may heavily rely on market 
sentiment conditions rather than rational deliberations of fundamentals. Furthermore, these inexperienced 
investors, who have not yet directly experienced the consequences of a major stock market downturn, are 
more prone to the optimism that fuels stock market bubbles (Greenwood and Nagel 2009). We therefore 
                                                 
6 We use firms’ total long term debt instead of corporate bonds as used in Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
because corporate bond issuance by public firms is rare in China. Most corporate bond issuers are 
nonlisted SOEs (Haw et al. 2005). The most prevalent financing channels for listed firms are direct 
borrowing from banks and equity issuance. 
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argue that the speed of novice entry rate into the stock market (NACT) is also a potential proxy for 
investor sentiment. NACT is defined as the natural log of the number of new investment accounts. 
Following the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006), we use principal components analysis to isolate 
the common component of the factors. Since the various components of sentiment may reflect the same 
sentiment but in different time frames, we perform factor analysis with all proxies and their lags to 
determine the best lag structure of each measure. The sentiment index is constructed as the first principal 
component based on the correlation matrix of sentiment proxies with each measure’s current or lagged 
value, whichever has a higher loading on the main factor, identified in the factor analysis. The first 
principal component explains 38.12% of the sample variance, which is comparable to the explanatory 
powers of sentiment indexes reported in major developed countries (Baker et al. 2012). The sentiment 
index is constructed as follows: sentimentt = −0.0863CEFDt−1 + 0.4960TURNt−1 + 0.3592NIPOt + 0.3286RIPOt + 0.3699Esharet − 0.3326DSGt−1 + 0.5120NACTt−1 (1) 
Because some of the sentiment proxies may reflect economic fundamentals over the business cycle, 
we then construct a second index that explicitly removes business cycle variation from each of the proxies 
prior to the principal component analysis. To accomplish this, we regress each of the seven raw proxies on 
the industrial production growth rate and the consumption growth rate. The corresponding first principal 
component explains 40.02% of the sample variance. The final sentiment index is constructed as follows: sentiment ⊥t = −0.0361CEFDt−1 + 0.4761TURNt−1 + 0.3418NIPOt + 0.3381RIPOt +0.4089Esharet − 0.3466DSGt−1 + 0.5036NACTt−1 (2) 
NACT has the highest loadings in the sentiment index and the factor loading on DSG is higher than 
those on CEFD, NIPO, and RIPO, which implies both proxies are of great importance in constructing a 
sentiment index in China. We verify the importance of DSG and NACT by examining their correlations 
with the quarterly sentiment survey produced by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). We use the changes 
in both of the sentiment indices and the change in the sentiment index from the PBOC survey to avoid 
autocorrelation bias (both sentiment indices and the survey are highly autocorrelated). The results in 
Panel A of Table 1 show that the sentiment index including NACT and DSG has a higher correlation 
(0.29) with the PBOC survey with significance at the 5% level, while the correlation between the 
sentiment index excluding NACT and DSG and the PBOC survey is lower (0.17) and statistically 
insignificant. Because the PBOC quarterly sentiment index is only available since 2003, we do not use it 
as a measure of market sentiment in our subsequent tests. 
Insert Table 1 here 
3.2. Validating the Sentiment Index 
    If excessive investor optimism leads to periods of market overvaluation, periods of high sentiment 
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should be followed by low long-run returns as the market price reverts to its intrinsic value. To investigate 
this issue, we run regressions of future excess market return (ExRETt+k) on the sentiment index and 
hypothesize that the sentiment coefficients should be negative. We calculate ExRETt+k as the value-
weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed 
deposits (Wang and Di Iorio 2007) and cumulate it over various horizons from 1 to 24 months. Following 
Brown and Cliff (2005) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), we use macroeconomic variables drawn 
from the conditional asset pricing literature as controls, namely, the contemporaneous market return 
(ExRETt), the aggregate earnings-to-price ratio (EPt)7, the monthly interest rate (RFt), and the inflation 
rate (INFLt). 
However, the sentiment index we construct is predetermined and not strictly exogenous, and 
therefore the OLS estimators from regressions on lagged endogenous variables are biased in finite 
samples (Stambaugh 1999). Moreover, the residuals from regressions with overlapping observations are 
serially correlated up to lag K-1 under both the null hypothesis and alternate hypotheses that fully account 
for time-varying expected returns (Swaminathan 1996). To circumvent these problems, we use the same 
approach as Nelson and Kim (1993) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) to assess significance by comparing 
test statistics to their empirical distributions computed from randomization simulations.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the coefficients and simulation p-values from the time-series regressions, 
with ExRET as a dependent variable on lagged SENT and other control variables. The coefficients on 
SENT decline monotonically through to the 14th month (after which they increase slowly) and become 
significantly negative at a p-value of 0.05 or lower as the forecasting horizon extends to twelve months 
and beyond. Panel C of Table 1 graphs the decline in the SENT coefficients over time. These results 
validate the sentiment index as a determinant of stock market pricing. Previous studies that investigate 
sentiment effects in the U.S. market document price reversals induced by sentiment over a relatively 
longer time horizon and in only certain segments of stocks. For example, in Brown and Cliff (2005), the 
significance occurs over the 12-month horizon or longer and only in the firm groups with big size and/or 
low book-to-market ratios. While differences in the way sentiment is measured may limit cross-study 
comparisons, no prior study documents such a significant and negative relation between sentiment and 
subsequent market returns as we do. The regression results in later tables show that the SENT coefficients 
in portfolios over 12-month and 15-month horizons are universally significantly negative no matter what 
factors are used to construct portfolios, indicating that sentiment affects most stocks in the market rather 
than only a portion of them. This widespread sentiment effect is consistent with the dominance of 
                                                 
7 We use the aggregate earnings-to-price ratio as an alternative measure to the dividend yield because, on 
average, less than half of Chinese firms (46%) paid dividends during our sample period. 
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individual investors and short sale prohibitions in China, which reduces the ability of investors to engage 
in arbitrage.  
The summary statistics and correlations of the components of the sentiment index are shown in Table 
2. We find that most of the components are significantly correlated with each other with the expected 
signs. In particular, NACT, the number of new investment accounts, is significantly correlated with every 
other component, consistent with NACT contributing most to the sentiment index. Orthogonalizing to 
macro variables only slightly changes the correlations among the sentiment components.  
Insert Table 2 here 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Sample Description and Data Sources 
Our investigation period ranges from January, 1999 to December, 2009. The primary reason for 
starting our analysis from the beginning of 1999 is that the first closed-end fund in China opened in April, 
1998 and CEFDs have been shown to be an important sentiment measure in many prior studies (e.g., Lee 
et al. 1991, Neal and Wheatley 1998). Our investor sentiment composite index consists of 132 monthly 
observations and the initial sample contains all nonfinancial firms listed on either of the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen A-share Stock Exchanges.8 Financial firms are excluded because information for these firms 
does not have the same meaning as for nonfinancial firms. We also exclude firms with negative equity 
book value. To be included in our sample, a company must have been listed for at least three years, and 
have filed the complete financial information required for our analysis. Our final sample comprises 
160,794 firm-month observations, after deleting the first year observations in the post-IPO period. All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent to reduce the effect of outliers on the 
analysis. We obtain financial and stock price data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) databases.  
4.2. Construction of Key Measures of Corporate Transparency 
4.2.1. Earnings Management. We first calculate annual discretionary accruals as the residual from the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). We add return on assets (ROA) as an additional control 
variable because previous research ﬁnds that the Jones model is misspeciﬁed for well-performing or 
poorly performing ﬁrms (Kothari et al. 2005). We estimate the following cross-sectional regression 
equation using firms in each industry for each fiscal year between 1996 and 20089:  
                                                 
8 The A-share markets (one in Shanghai and one in Shenzhen) are open to domestic investors. In contrast, 
the B-share market is open to investors with access to foreign currencies (e.g., U.S. or Hong Kong 
dollars) and it is very small compared to the A-share markets.  
9 We require each industry to have at least 20 observations in any given year. 
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TACCjt
TAjt-1
= a 1
TAjt-1
+ b
∆Salesjt
TAjt-1
 + c
PPEjt
TAjt-1
+ dROAjt +ε𝑗𝑡 (3) 
Where TACCjt denotes total accruals for firm j during year t, TAjt-1 denotes total assets for firm j at 
the end of year t-1, ΔSalesjt denotes change in sales for firm j in year t, PPEjt denotes property, plant, 
and equipment for firm j at the end of year t, and ROA jt represents return on assets. 
Discretionary annual accruals (DACCjt) are calculated using the parameter estimates from Eq. (3):  
DACCjt=
TACCjt
TAjt-1
-�a� 1
TAjt-1
 + b� ∆Salesjt-∆Recjt
TAjt-1
 + c� PPEjt
TAjt-1
 + d� ROAjt� (4) 
where the hats over the coefficients denote estimated values from regression Eq. (3). ΔRECjt is the 
change in accounts receivable from the prior year. The inclusion of ΔRecjt in Eq. (4) is the standard 
modification of the Jones model. Following Hutton et al. (2009), we use the variable OPAQUE as a 
measure of opacity in financial reports. It is calculated as the three-year moving sum of the fractional 
ranking of the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm j10. Thus:  
OPAQUE = rank (|DACC t-1|) + rank (|DACC t-2|) + rank (|DACC t-3|)  (5) 
For each year, we construct the quintile portfolios based on OPAQUE and calculate the equally weighted 
average stock returns for each portfolio.  
4.2.2. Quality of Audit Firms and Audit Opinions. We collect data concerning audit firms and audit 
opinions from 1999. Prior to that date, the audit firms are mostly affiliated with government institutions or 
government-controlled bodies and were perceived as lacking audit independence and professionalism 
(Chan et al. 2006). BIG4 is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 firms 
and OPIN is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the audit opinion is qualified, negative, or a 
disclaimer. We classify these audit opinions as non-clean opinions. There are only a small proportion of 
publicly traded firms in China that hire Big 4 auditors (they only account for 6.58% of firm-year 
observations) and only a small proportion of listed firms receive non-clean audit opinions. These firms 
may have specific characteristics that are also related to the sensitivity to market sentiment and this can 
lead to selection biases. To reduce the possible selection biases, we use propensity score matching to 
construct control samples. First, we run a logit regression to predict auditor choices/opinions. We include 
                                                 
10 Publicly listed firms in China are required to provide the cash flow statement since 1998, so we follow 
Jones (1991) to indirectly estimate total accruals prior to 1998 and directly calculate total accruals as the 
difference between net income and operating cash flow after 1998. We use the fractional ranking of 
|DACC| within each year instead of its value to account for this difference when we compute OPAQUE. A 
fractional ranking is the raw rank divided by the number of observations. For example, the fractional 
ranking of 1 and 10 among the numbers 1 to 10 are 0.1 and 1, respectively. 
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firm characteristics that have been shown in previous studies to be associated with auditor 
choices/opinions in China (Chan et al. 2006, Chen et al. 2010), such as size, leverage, ROA, and 
ownership concentration. The coefficients from running the regression are consistent with the results 
obtained in previous studies11. Large firms, firms with more ownership controlled by a dominant investor, 
and cross listed firms are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. State owned firms and firms with high 
leverage are less likely to hire Big 4 auditors. Also, we find that small, old, or loss firms, firms with 
higher leverage or a higher percentage of accounts receivable are more likely to receive non-clean audit 
opinions. State-controlled firms (SOEs) are less likely to receive non-clean audit opinions, consistent with 
the notion that SOEs often use political influences to obtain a clean audit opinion.  
We use the predicted values from the logit regression (propensity scores) to construct a nearest-
neighbor matched sample for the firms audited by the one of the Big 4 and for firms with non-clean audit 
opinions. In each year, we choose, with replacement, the firms audited by local auditors (firms with clean 
audit opinions) with propensity scores closest to those of each firm audited by the Big 4 (firms with non-
clean audit opinions). These observations constitute the control samples that we use in our sentiment 
effect tests based on auditor reputation (Big 4, non-Big 4) and audit report (clean, non-clean).  
4.2.3. Related Party Transactions. We expect that the complexities involved in valuing RPTs are related 
to the magnitude as well as to the number of RPTs. We capture the magnitude of RPTs by the level of 
abnormal RPTs. Following Jian and Wong (2010), we use an OLS regression model to remove the normal 
components of related party transactions that are associated with the following firm characteristics: size, 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (TA); leverage, measured by total debt over total assets 
(LEV); and growth, measured by market-to-book equity (MB). We also control for industry fixed effects 
using the 13-industry classification of the CSRC. The equation is: 
 RPT jt/SALE jt = μ1 + μ2 TA jt + μ3 LEV jt + μ4 MBjt + industry fixed effects + ε jt (5) 
RPTjt is the value of related party transactions that firm j discloses in its annual report at year t and 
we use the residual from this regression as our proxy for abnormal RPTs. We divide the estimated 
abnormal RPTjt by the firm’s sales volume to further mitigate the firm size effect. 
We also capture the complexity of RPTs by using the number of RPT transactions that a firm has in a 
given year. We argue that a firm with one incidence of RPT would be easier to value than a firm with a 
dozen RPTs. To form a complexity measure of RPTs (CRPT) that captures both the magnitude and the 
number of transactions, we first rank firms according to the number of RPTs and the size of abnormal 
RPTs, respectively, and then sum up two rankings for each firm and use the resulting composite 
complexity fractional ranking (CRPT) as the basis to divide firms into portfolios.  
                                                 
11 The detailed regression results are available from the authors on request. 
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4.2.4. State Ownership. In China, each listed company has a dominant owner that typically owns more 
than 30% of the outstanding shares while the second largest stock owner typically owns 10% or less of 
the shares (Chen et al. 2009). These dominant owners can have a major influence on the quality and 
transparency of a firm’s disclosures. Researchers typically breakdown firms on the basis of whether the 
dominant stockholder is a private person or an entity or organ of the central or local government. In light 
of this ownership feature, we separate listed firms into two ownership categories: (1) privately controlled 
firms, whose dominant or controlling owner is a non-government unit such as entrepreneurs, townships 
and villages, and foreign companies, and (2) SOEs, whose dominant owner is a government-related entity. 
In constructing this classification we take great care to identify the true or ultimate owner (i.e., we go 
behind nominee names to identify the real controlling stockholder). We obtain ultimate ownership 
information from firms’ annual reports for years since 2003 and manually collect the data of the ultimate 
owner for years prior to 2003. 
4.2.5. The Characteristics of Stock Returns and Key Measures of Corporate Transparency. Table 3 
presents the descriptive statistics for our variables. The mean monthly return is 2.1% with a median of 
0.73%. The average stock returns increase as the accumulation period lengthens. Most firms are profitable 
(positive ROA) and there is active trading in the firms’ shares (the mean LIQ is 0.516, indicating that 
shares change hands frequently). Approximately 72% of firm-year observations are for state-controlled 
listed firms. The summary statistics for DACC, OPAQUE, the number of RPTs, RPT/Sales, and CRPT all 
show substantial variability across firms. The mean number of RPTs per firm, per year is 13.2. Big 4 audit 
firms audit 6.6% of firm-year observations and 4.2% of observations have non-clean audit opinions. Table 
3, Panel B shows the means and standard deviations of SENT and macroeconomic variables. By 
construction, SENT has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Panel B of Table 3 also shows the 
correlations among SENT and the macroeconomic variables. This shows that the correlations between 
SENT and the control variables are either moderate or insignificant. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 4 shows the correlations among firm characteristics as investigated by Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and our transparency measures. As can been seen from the table, the correlations among firm 
characteristics and our transparency measures are low. The results indicate that our corporate 
transparency variables are not alternative representations of the firm characteristics as investigated 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Firm size is positively related with OPAQUE, state ownership, and 
RPTs, and is negatively related to liquidity; however, the correlation coefficients are quite small.  
Insert Table 4 here 
4.3. Regression Models  
To examine the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices, we regress future cumulative returns on 
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sentiment and control variables. As the results in Panel B in Table 1 suggest that significant market 
reversion starts from the 12-month horizon, we choose three specific horizons of 9, 12, and 15 months to 
observe the association between sentiment level and subsequent returns.  
Following Brown and Cliff (2005), we examine the association between investor sentiment and 
subsequent stock returns after controlling for EP, RF, INFL as well as the Fama-French three factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML) (Fama and French 1993). Rouwenhorst (1999) documents that emerging 
markets, similar to developed markets, exhibit the well-documented equity return patterns of small stocks 
outperforming large stocks and value stocks outperforming growth stocks. Wang and Di Iorio (2007) and 
Eun and Huang (2007) confirm the findings of Rouwenhorst (1999) using data from the Chinese equity 
markets. The regression model for estimating the sentiment effect is:  
∑ [ ExRETt+k]Kk=1 =α+β SENTt+γ1EPt+ γ2RFt+ γ3INFLt+γ4MKTt+γ5SMBt+ γ6HMLt+εt+k   (7) 
Where ∑ [ ExRETt+k]Kk=1  is the k-period portfolio return and SENT refers to the sentiment index. EP 
is the market-level earnings-to-price ratio. RF is the risk-free rate, measured by the monthly interest rate 
on one-year fixed deposits. INFL is the monthly rate of inflation. MKT is the excess return on the market 
portfolio, and SMB (HML) is the difference between the average returns on the small-stock (high 
BE/ME) portfolio and average returns on the large-stock (low BE/ME) portfolio. The coefficient β 
indicates the sensitivity of expected subsequent returns to investor sentiment. As high (low) sentiment 
predicts upward (downward) pressure on stock prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals, β is 
expected to be negative.  
4.4. Empirical Results 
We carry out the regression model estimation for each set of portfolios sorted by our proxies for 
corporate transparency. Tables 5 to 8 summarize the SENT coefficient estimation results on our measures 
of financial information quality. For brevity’s sake, we do not report the coefficients for EP, RF, INFL, 
MKT, SMB, and HML as they are not the prime focus of our study. We match OPAQUE, audit opinion 
(OPIN), and CRPT for fiscal year-ends in calendar year t-1 to monthly returns from July in year t through 
June in year t+1 to ensure that the variables are known before the returns they are used to explain. Type of 
ownership (OWN) and BIG4 in year t are matched to monthly returns from July in year t through June in 
year t+1, since significant events, such as change in auditor or the ultimate controlling owners, are 
reported to the regulator (the CSRC) and the stock market within 2 days after their occurrence. We form 
equal-weighted quintile portfolios according to OPAQUE and CRPT and construct pair portfolios based 
on the discrete variables BIG4, OPIN, and OWN.  
Table 5 reports the results of accruals management (OPAQUE). The firms are divided into quintile 
segments with Q1 consisting of firms with the lowest OPAQUE score. In contrast, firms in Q5 have the 
highest OPAQUE score. In line with the aforementioned results of market reversals shown in Table 1 
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Panel B, the bias-adjusted coefficient estimates of SENT over the three horizons are universally negative 
and all are significant over the 12 and 15 month horizons. The differences between the SENT coefficients 
in Q5 and Q1 are statistically significant across all three horizons. The results are also very significant in 
economic terms. For example, if we look at the 12-month horizon, an increase of one standard deviation 
in market over optimism (i.e., positive sentiment index) results in an additional 250 basis points decline in 
the market value of firms with high opaqueness over those with low opaqueness in the subsequent 12 
month period. These results support our hypothesis that firms with high OPAQUE scores are more 
vulnerable to investor sentiment changes than are firms with low OPAQUE scores.  
Insert Table 5 here 
Panel A, Table 6 shows the results for audit opinions. The SENT coefficients on the portfolio with 
non-clean audit opinions are considerably lower than those on the matched firm portfolio with clean 
opinions and the differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level across the three horizons12. 
This evidence suggests that firms that receive qualified, negative, or disclaimer audit opinions are more 
sensitive to investor sentiment than are their clean audit opinion counterparts. The economic significance 
is compelling. If we look at the 12-month horizon, firms that receive a non-clean audit opinion have to 
bear an extra 330 basis points cumulative decline in their market value when compared to their clean 
report control firms for a one standard deviation change in market over optimism (i.e., positive sentiment 
index). This finding is consistent with Choi and Jeter (1992) who find that modified audit opinions are 
associated with clients that have noisier or less persistent (or both) financial information. 
Insert Table 6 here 
The results on auditor choice are summarized in Panel B, Table 6. As we expect, the SENT 
coefficients for firms with Big 4 auditors are considerably higher (i.e., less negative) than those of their 
control counterparts, and their differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level across the three 
time horizons. This evidence supports our hypothesis that firms can reduce market uncertainty and hence 
reduce their vulnerability to sentiment through hiring a prestige international auditor with a strong 
reputation for independence and a high level of professionalism.  
The results for related party transactions (RPTs) are presented in Table 7. We use a composite 
complexity index (CRPT) to capture the magnitude and number of RPTs. Firm-level CRPTs are sorted 
into five quintiles (Q1 to Q5) with firms in Q1 having the lowest CRPTs. The SENT coefficients 
generally become more negative as CRPTs increase. The high-minus-low analysis shows a significant 
                                                 
12 As a robustness check, we exclude the observations with disclaimer audit opinions and focus on 
qualified/negative-opinion firms. We find that our results still hold. 
 
18 
 
difference on the SENT coefficients between Q5 and Q1. Consistent with our hypothesis, the results 
indicate that the sentiment effects on firm valuation increase as CRPTs increase.  
Insert Table 7 here 
Table 8 reports the results on the firm’s type of controlling shareholder. We first divide all publicly 
listed firms into state-controlled firms (SOEs) and private firms. Across three horizons, we consistently 
find that the SENT coefficients on SOEs are more negative than those on private firms. The SOE-minus-
Private portfolio comparison suggests that the differences in the SENT coefficients are highly significant. 
The evidence supports hypothesis 5. State-controlled listed firms are likely to be less transparent and thus 
have a higher exposure to sentiment. 
Notwithstanding the general nature of state control, Chen et al. (2009) argue that the different types of 
state owners have somewhat different objectives and this can affect the performance and actions of the 
listed firms they control. In particular, local government control, where the listed firm’s major shareholder 
is a city or municipal government, results in a more market-oriented approach when compared to firms 
that are controlled by the central government. Thus, we expect that firms that are controlled by the central 
government will be the least transparent and thus the most susceptible to sentiment, followed by firms 
controlled by local government, and then privately controlled firms. In light of this, we divide the SOE 
group into 1) local SOEs, which are controlled by local governments (e.g., the Bureau of State Assets 
Management and the Municipal Finance Bureau); and 2) central SOEs, which are controlled by the 
central government (e.g., the Ministry of Finance and the Central Industrial Enterprises Administration 
Committee). From this partitioning, we obtain two further findings, 1) the SENT coefficient in both SOE 
subgroups are more negative than those of private firms and the differences are highly significant; 2) the 
SENT coefficients for central SOEs are more negative than those for local SOEs with the differences 
being significant at the 1% level across all three horizons. The results support our hypothesis that SOEs 
are more vulnerable to investor sentiment shifts than private firms and that central SOEs are more 
affected by sentiment than local SOEs. 
Insert Table 8 here 
4.5. Additional Findings and Robustness Checks 
4.5.1. Liquidity as an Alternative Measure of Transparency. Prior research finds that share turnover is 
a proxy for information asymmetry since information asymmetry between more informed and less 
informed investors reduces expected liquidity in the market for a firm’s shares (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 
1985, Merton 1987). In a recent study, Lang et al. (2012) find that greater transparency is significantly 
associated with higher liquidity and the relation is particularly strong in countries where disclosure 
requirements are weak. Therefore, to further test our argument that corporate transparency is a 
determinant of firm-level sentiment effects, we calculate the association between liquidity and the cross-
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sectional effects of sentiment. Stock turnover (LIQ) is calculated as the aggregate monthly volume of 
trade divided by the market value of equity over the past twelve months ending in June of year t and 
matched to monthly returns from July of year t through June of year t+1. The results shown in Table 9 
indicate that the most “liquid” quintile has the smallest SENT coefficients and the differences in β 
between the most liquid and the most illiquid quintiles are all significant at the 1% level. These results 
indicate that the most liquid stocks are less sensitive to shifts in investor sentiment, consistent with our 
conjecture that greater sentiment effects are associated with higher information asymmetry between 
insiders and outside investors.  
Insert Table 9 here 
4.5.2. Sub-sample period analysis. China’s stock market experienced a sharp increase followed by a 
major collapse in the 2007-2008 period. During this period, stock prices more than doubled and 
subsequently fell by more than 50%. Although this bubble period is a particularly important and useful 
period for detecting the investor sentiment effects, it is important for us to examine whether our results 
are completely driven by this period when sentiment effects are likely to be particularly high. This allows 
us to test the generalizability of our results under different sentiment scenarios.  
To examine this issue, we rerun our tests to cover the sample period to 1999-2005 (we need an extra 
one year of stock returns to examine the subsequent price reversal). We find that the market reversal 
during the 1999-2005 sample period becomes statistically significant at the 14th month (rather than in 
month 12 as reported for the whole sample period, 1999-2009). Table 10 shows the SENT coefficient 
estimation results on our corporate transparency variables for the 1999-2005 period. The summary results 
for the full sample (1999-2009), extracted from Tables 5-9, are also included as a comparison. We only 
focus on the 12-month and 15-month horizons because it takes longer to observe market reversal. The 
coefficients on SENT for 1999-2005 are not much different than those for 1999-2009. Transparent firms 
(as measured by all of our proxies) are still less likely to be affected by investor sentiment than are non-
transparent firms during period of 1999-2005. The results suggest that the evidence we report in Tables 5-
9 is not completely driven by the major bull and bear market episode in 2007-2008. 
Insert Table 10 here 
4.5.3. An Aggregate Measure of Transparency. The use of any one structural variable (e.g., auditor, 
RPTs) can produce measurement errors in separating transparent from non-transparent firms. One way to 
reduce measurement error is to construct an aggregate score of transparency. To construct this aggregate 
measure, we sum the six transparency measures previously examined (opacity in financial reports, 
auditor, audit opinion, the complexity of related party transactions, state ownership, and stock trading 
liquidity). Because the variables have different scales, we recalibrate them as zero or one. Financial 
reporting opacity and related party transactions are coded one if the magnitudes of OPAQUE and CRPT 
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for firm j are below the medians for the year. LIQ is coded one if firm j’s stock turnover is above the 
median for the year. A Big 4 auditor is coded one while a local auditor is coded zero; an unqualified 
opinion is coded one while a non-clean opinion is coded zero; and a privately controlled listed firm is 
coded one while a state-controlled firm is coded zero. The highest possible score (indicating a high level 
of transparency) is 6 and the lowest possible score is 0. The firm-year observations are grouped into three 
equal-size portfolios: high transparency, middle transparency, and low transparency. 
In Table 11, we show the coefficients on SENT for the three portfolios, high (i.e., high transparency), 
middle, and low (i.e., low transparency) and for three time horizons, 9, 12, and 15 months. The results are 
strong and provide evidence that is consistent with our previous analyses. Specifically, the coefficients on 
SENT are significantly less negative for highly transparent firms than for firms that are not transparent. 
Thus, investors are more likely to use market sentiment to value less transparent firms. 
Insert Table 11 here 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines investor sentiment and its effects on asset pricing in the context of China’s 
financial markets. Prior research tests sentiment effects in developed markets and finds that the cross-
sectional impacts of investor sentiment relate to a firm’s characteristics such as size, age, and growth, i.e., 
factors that affect valuation subjectivity. However, no prior study has systematically investigated the 
sentiment effects in emerging markets and examined whether corporate transparency, a factor largely 
determined by the firm’s financial reporting implementation and management discretion, can also 
influence the impact of sentiment on stock prices. We present comprehensive evidence that corporate 
transparency explains the degree to which general investor sentiment is reflected in a firm’s stock price. 
These findings highlight the importance of a transparent information environment in mitigating 
sentiment-driven volatility. 
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Table 1  
Validation of the Sentiment Index and its Association with Future Stock Returns 
Panel A 
Correlations among the changes in three different sentiment measures 
 PBOC SENT5 SENT7 
PBOC 1.00   
    
SENT5 0.17 1.00  
 (0.23)   
SENT7 0.29 0.78 1.00 
 (0.03) (0.00)  
Panel shows the Pearson correlations among the changes in three different sentiment measures, from September 
2003 to December 2009. PBOC is a direct survey data of investor sentiment conducted by the People’s Bank of 
China on a quarterly basis since 2003. SENT5 and SENT7 refer to the sentiment indices constructed without and 
with DSG (growth in savings deposits) and NACT (number of new investment accounts), respectively. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel B 
Time-series regressions of overall excess market returns on investor sentiment (SENT). 
∑ [( ExRET𝑡+𝑘)/𝐾]K𝑘=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 ExRETt + γ2 EP t + γ3 RF t + γ4 INFLt + ε t+k 
K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
β (*100) 0.64 0.57 0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.38 
p-value (0.73) (0.64) (0.64) (0.80) (0.68) (0.67) (0.62) (0.55) 
         
K 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
β (*100) -0.53 -0.66 -0.78 -0.85 -0.88 -0.89 -0.86 -0.81 
p-value (0.32) (0.17) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
K 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
β (*100) -0.76 -0.71 -0.71 -0.68 -0.68 -0.64 -0.67 -0.67 
p-value (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
SENT refers to the investor sentiment index. ExRET refers to the equal-weighted market return over the risk-free 
rate. EP refers to the market-level earnings-to-price ratio. RF refers to the risk-free rate, measured by the monthly 
interest rate on one-year fixed deposits. INFL refers to the monthly rate of inflation. Simulated p-values are reported 
in parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0. 
 
Panel C 
Graph of the SENT coefficient (β) over time 
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Table 2 
Investor Sentiment Data 
In Panel A, we show summary statistics for the raw sentiment proxies. CEFD is the value-weighted average discount rate of closed-end mutual funds. TURN is 
natural log of monthly market trading volume divided by average market value, detrended by the five-month moving average. NIPO is the monthly number of 
initial public offerings. RIPO is the average market-adjusted first-day returns of initial public offerings. Eshare is the ratio of equity issues to total equity issues and 
bank borrowing. DSG is the growth rate of savings deposits controlling for the growth of money supply (M0). NACT is the natural log number of new investment 
accounts (in thousands). SENT is the first principal component of the seven sentiment proxies. In Panel B, we regress each of the seven proxies on the growth in 
industrial production and consumption growth rate. The orthogonalized proxies, labeled with a “⊥,” are the residuals from these regressions. SENT⊥ is the first 
principal component of the seven orthogonalized proxies. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
      Correlations with 
Sentiment 
Correlations with Sentiment Components 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 SENT SENT⊥  CEFD TURN NIPO RIPO Eshare DSG 
Panel A: Raw Data 
CEFD t-1(%) -18.31 13.72 -28.03 -19.07 -9.92 -0.14 0.02  1     
TURN t-1 5.73 0.47 5.37 5.72 6.13 0.81a 0.71a  -0.28a 1    
NIPO t 6.81 5.82 3 6 10 0.59a 0.57a  0.13 0.31a 1   
RIPO t (%) 1.16 0.60 0.71 1.02 1.50 0.54a 0.57a  0.18c 0.23b 0.11 1   
Esharet (%) 1.18 1.44 0.20 0.60 1.65 0.60a 0.66a  0.22a 0.25a 0.49a 0.23b 1  
DSG t-1 (%) -0.04 0.91 -0.60 -0.03 0.44 -0.54a -0.57a  0.01 -0.28a -0.29a -0.22b -0.28a 1 
NACT t-1 5.93 1.25 4.77 5.79 6.94 0.84a 0.77a  0.18b 0.70a 0.34a 0.50a 0.35a -0.23a 
Panel B: Controlling for Macroeconomics Conditions 
CEFD⊥ t-1(%) 0.00 10.56 -8.87 0.10 7.16 0.01 0.06  1     
TURN⊥ t-1 0.00 0.41 -0.31 -0.07 0.31 0.77a 0.80a  -0.07 1    
NIPO⊥ t 0.00 5.31 -3.97 -1.21 2.71 0.56a 0.57a  -0.03 0.37a 1   
RIPO⊥ t (%) 0.00 0.60 -0.45 -0.15 0.34 0.53a 0.57a  0.25a 0.25b 0.10 1   
Eshare⊥ t (%) 0.00 1.42 -0.92 -0.57 0.50 0.67a 0.68a  0.02 0.38a 0.46a 0.23b 1  
DSG⊥ t-1 (%) 0.00 0.90 -0.60 0.05 0.49 -0.58a -0.58a  0.08 -0.38a -0.24b -0.22b -0.27a 1 
NACT⊥ t-1 0.00 1.11 -0.90 -0.03 0.75 0.79a 0.84a  0.38a 0.66a 0.27a 0.55a 0.46a -0.32a 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Returns, Firm Characteristics, and Transparency, and SENT and Macro-
economic Variables 
Panel A : Summary Statistics of Stock Returns, Firm Characteristics, and Transparency 
Stock returns Mean SD P25 Median P75 
R 0.021 0.172 -0.067 0.0073 0.093 
R9-month 0.162 0.537 -0.193 0.0781 0.463 
R12-month 0.210 0.633 -0.238 0.0769 0.597 
R15-month 0.258 0.695 -0.248 0.121 0.679 
Firm characteristics      
ln(ME) 13.669 1.007 12.991 13.576 14.220 
AGE 6.791 3.380 4.000 6.000 9.000 
RISK 0.131 0.077 0.086 0.116 0.162 
ROA 0.016 0.093 0.008 0.029 0.054 
Dividend  0.464 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BM 1.007 1.150 0.401 0.743 1.358 
GS 0.231 0.638 -0.031 0.135 0.335 
EF/A 0.066 0.227 -0.019 0.073 0.179 
LIQ 0.516 0.392 0.219 0.408 0.694 
Transparency measures     
Private 0.283 0.451 0 0 1 
SOE (all) 0.717 0.451 0 1 1 
SOE (local) 0.536 0.499 0 1 1 
SOE (central) 0.181 0.385 0 0 0 
DACC -0.001 0.087 -0.044 -0.001 0.040 
OPAQUE  1.497 0.571 1.079 1.481 1.903 
BIG4 0.066 0.241 0 0 0 
OPIN 0.042 0.200 0 0 0 
No. RPT 13.196 16.795 3.000 8.000 17.000 
RPT/Sale 0.611 2.796 0.036 0.212 0.590 
CRPT  1.000 0.483 0.608 1.009 1.387 
R is monthly returns. R9-month, R12-month, and R15-month are cumulative returns over the 9-month, 12-month, 
and 15-month horizons, respectively. ln(ME) refers to the log of market value in thousand RMB. AGE is 
the number of years since the firm was listed. RISK is stock return volatility over one year. ROA is net 
income divided by total assets. Dividend is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm pays a dividend in the 
financial year. BM refers to the book-to-market ratio. GS is the annual growth in sales. EF/A is the 
growth in external financing divided by total assets. LIQ is the monthly trading volume divided by the 
firm’s market value of equity. Private, SOE (all), SOE (local), and SOE (central) are ownership variables 
representing whether the controlling stock owner is a private investor, the state, local city or municipal 
government, or the central government or its ministries. DACC is a firm’s discretionary accruals. 
OPAQUE is the fractional ranking measure of a firm’s opaqueness based on the discretionary accruals. 
BIG 4 is equal to 1 if a listed firm hires a Big 4 auditor, otherwise 0. OPIN is equal to 1 if a listed firm 
receives a qualified, negative, or disclaimer audit opinion, otherwise 0. No. RPT is the number of related 
party transactions reported by a firm in a year. RPT/Sale is a measure of abnormal RPTs scaled by sales. 
CRPT is the complexity of RPTs based on fractional ranking of the number of RPTs and RPT/Sales. 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics and Correlations of SENT and the Control Variables 
 Mean SD P25 Median P75 
SENT 0.000 1.000 -0.842 -0.175 0.610 
EP(%) 0.086 0.026 0.059 0.087 0.097 
RF(%) 0.207 0.055 0.188 0.188 0.210 
INFL(%) 1.565 2.546 -0.300 1.200 2.800 
MKT 0.013 0.096 -0.050 0.012 0.061 
SMB 0.006 0.042 -0.018 0.008 0.032 
HML 0.004 0.027 -0.009 0.003 0.020 
Correlations SENT EP RF Infl MKT SMB 
EP(%) -0.05      
RF(%) 0.18b -0.11     
INFL(%) 0.00 0.04 0.56a    
MKT 0.12 0.25a -0.09 0.21b   
SMB 0.15c -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.07  
HML -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.00 -0.02 
SENT is the investor sentiment index. EP is the market-level earnings-to-price ratio. RF is the risk-free 
rate, measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits. INFL is the monthly rate of 
inflation. MKT, SMB, HML are three factor-mimicking portfolios constructed following the Fama and 
French (1993) methodology for all nonfinancial listed firms in China. MKT is the excess return on the 
market portfolio of stocks. SMB (HML) is the difference, each month, between average returns on the 
small-stock portfolio (the high-BE/ME portfolio) and average returns on the large-stock portfolio (the 
low-BE/ME portfolio). Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Correlations among Firm Characteristics and Transparency Measures  
Pearson\Spearman ln(ME) Age Risk ROA Dividend BM GS EF/A OPAQUE State CRPT Liquidity 
ln(ME)  0.11 0.18 0.39 0.34 -0.10 0.18 0.27 0.03 0.10 0.20 -0.03 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.21  0.25 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.25 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) 
Risk 0.23 0.26  -0.02 -0.13 -0.42 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.53 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.91) (0.00) 
ROA 0.32 -0.08 -0.01  0.51 -0.05 0.32 0.39 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.07 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.37)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dividend 0.23 -0.16 -0.13 0.36  0.13 0.22 0.29 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.12 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BM -0.09 -0.07 -0.20 0.05 0.09  0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.16 0.13 -0.41 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GS 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.22 0.10 -0.01  0.43 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.04 
 (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40)  (0.00) (0.04) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) 
EF/A 0.28 -0.10 -0.02 0.55 0.26 0.06 0.34  0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.08 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) 
OPAQUE 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.05  -0.09 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.00) (0.51) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.25) (0.10) 
State 0.08 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.11 0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.09  0.14 -0.17 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CRPT 0.21 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.14  -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.79) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Liquidity -0.02 0.25 0.37 -0.06 -0.14 -0.23 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.19 -0.08  
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)  
Pearson correlations are in the lower diagonal and Spearman correlations are in the upper diagonal. As we use propensity score 
matching to control for firm characteristics when we examine whether big 4 auditors and audit opinions mitigate or enhance sentiment 
effect, we did not include BIG4 and OPIN in the correlation table. See Table 3 for variable descriptions. 
31 
 
Table 5. Sentiment Effects and Accruals Management (OPAQUE)  
9-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.061 -0.064 -0.076 -0.069 -0.081 -0.020 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.00) 
12-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.121 -0.124 -0.138 -0.131 -0.146 -0.025 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
15-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.151 -0.156 -0.168 -0.161 -0.175 -0.023 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-French factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
We report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted quintile portfolios formed on OPAQUE. 
OPAQUE is the three year moving sum of the ranking of the absolute value of discretionary accruals for 
firm j. Q5-Q1 represents the difference of average stock returns between the top quintile (Q5) and the 
bottom quintile (Q1). Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0.  
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Table 6. Sentiment Effects and Audit firms and Audit Opinions 
Panel A 
Non-clean versus Clean Opinions 
 
Panel B 
Big4 versus Local Auditors 
Horizons Non-clean Clean Non-clean-clean Big4 Local Local-Big4 
9-month -0.116 -0.085 -0.032 -0.068 -0.088 -0.020 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00) 
12-month -0.191 -0.158 -0.033 -0.125 -0.151 -0.026 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
15-month -0.226 -0.186 -0.039 -0.161 -0.184 -0.023 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-French factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
We report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio aggregated by auditor choice and 
audit opinions. Big4 refers to the portfolio of all firms audited by Big 4 auditors. Firms audited by 
local auditors (Local) are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity score with controls for firm 
characteristics associated with auditor choices. Non-clean refers to the portfolio of all firms with non-
clean audit opinions (i.e., qualified, negative, or disclaimer). Firms with unqualified audit opinions 
(Clean) are chosen using a nearest-neighbor propensity score with controls for firm characteristics 
associated with the likelihood of receiving a non-clean audit opinion. Simulated p-values are in 
parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0. 
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Table 7. Sentiment Effects and Related Party Transactions (CRPT)  
 9-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.062 -0.070 -0.070 -0.072 -0.074 -0.012 
(0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01) 
12-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.123 -0.131 -0.132 -0.135 -0.136 -0.013 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
15-month horizon 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.153 -0.162 -0.166 -0.165 -0.164 -0.012 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-French factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
We report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted quintile portfolio formed on the complexity 
index of related party transactions. The complexity of RPTs for firm j is the sum of the ranking of 
abnormal RPTs and the ranking of the number of RPTs. Q1 refers to firms with the value of RPT 
complexity (CRPT) in the bottom quintile. Q5 refers to firms with the value of RPT complexity (CRPT) 
in the top quintile. We report the coefficient on SENT for each quintile. Simulated p-values are in 
parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0. 
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Table 8. Sentiment Effects and State Ownership 
9-month horizon 
Private SOE Local SOE Central SOE 
-0.040 -0.050 -0.046 -0.059 
(0.48) (0.33) (0.36) (0.19) 
SOE-Private Local SOE-Private Central SOE-Private Central SOE-Local SOE 
-0.010 -0.006 -0.020 -0.014 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
12-month horizon 
Private SOE Local SOE Central SOE 
-0.099 -0.108 -0.104 -0.119 
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
SOE-Private Local SOE-Private Central SOE-Private Central SOE-Local SOE 
-0.009 -0.006 -0.020 -0.014 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) 
15-month horizon 
Private SOE Local SOE Central SOE 
-0.121 -0.134 -0.130 -0.144 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SOE-Private Local SOE-Private Central SOE-Private Central SOE-Local SOE 
-0.014 -0.011 -0.024 -0.013 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-French factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
We report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio formed on a firm’s ultimate 
owner. SOE refers to the listed firms ultimately controlled by local or central government whereas 
Private refers to the privately controlled listed firms. Local SOEs are defined as SOEs owned by local 
governments (e.g., the Bureau of State Assets Management and the Municipal Finance Bureau) and 
central SOEs are defined as SOEs owned by the central government (e.g., the Ministry of Finance and 
the Central Industrial Enterprises Administration Committee). Simulated p-values are in parentheses 
and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0. 
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Table 9. Sentiment Effects and Liquidity 
9-month 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.051 -0.057 -0.056 -0.046 -0.024 0.026 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.30) (0.41) (0.68) (0.00) 
12-month 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.109 -0.117 -0.117 -0.106 -0.082 0.026 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) 
15-month 
Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(high) Q5-Q1 
-0.137 -0.140 -0.141 -0.128 -0.098 0.039 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-French factors 
(MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
We report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted quintile portfolio formed on liquidity. 
Liquidity is the monthly trading volume divided by the firm’s market value of equity. Simulated p-values 
are in parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β ≠ 0. 
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Table 10 Full-period (1999-2009) and Sub-period Tests (1999-2005) 
 
 12-month 15-month 
 1999-2005 1999-2009 1999-2005 1999-2009 
OPAQUE: Q5-Q1 -0.028 
(0.00) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.028 
(0.00) 
-0.023 
(0.00) 
Audit Opinion: Non-Clean-Clean -0.013 
(0.03) 
-0.033 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.10) 
-0.039 
(0.00) 
Audit Firm: Local – Big4 -0.027 
(0.00) 
-0.026 
(0.00) 
-0.17 
(0.05) 
-0.023 
(0.00) 
CRPT: Q5-Q1 -0.009 
(0.04) 
-0.013 
(0.00) 
-0.009 
(0.00) 
-0.012 
(0.00) 
State Ownership: SOE-Private -0.023 
(0.00) 
-0.009 
(0.05) 
-0.027 
(0.00) 
-0.014 
(0.02) 
State Ownership: Local-Private -0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.08) 
-0.022 
(0.00) 
-0.011 
(0.03) 
State Ownership: Central-Private -0.044 
(0.00) 
-0.020 
(0.01) 
-0.046 
(0.00) 
-0.014 
(0.00) 
State Ownership: Central-Local -0.032 
(0.00) 
-0.014 
(0.00) 
-0.024 
(0.00) 
-0.013 
(0.01) 
LIQ: Q5-Q1 0.043 
(0.00) 
0.026 
(0.01) 
0.055 
(0.00) 
0.039 
(0.00) 
See Tables 5 - 9 for the definitions of OPAQUE, Audit Opinion, Audit Firm, CRPT, Ownership, and 
Liquidity. The Table shows the differences in sentiment coefficients between high (5) and low (1) scores 
for OPAQUE, CRPT and LIQ or between different types of audit opinions, audit firm size, and 
ownership. P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 10 Sub-period Tests (1999-2005) 
OPAQUE       
12-month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 
Β 0.015 0.007 0.002 0.007 -0.013 -0.028 
p-value (0.93) (0.85) (0.71) (0.92) (0.24) (0.00) 
       
15-month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 
Β -0.005 -0.013 -0.016 -0.014 -0.033 -0.028 
p-value (0.12) (0.09) (0.03) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) 
Audit Opinion     Audit Firm    
12-month Nonclean Clean Non-Clean-Clean  12-month Big 4 Local Local-Big4 
β -0.047 -0.034 -0.013  β -0.008 -0.034 0.027 
p-value (0.01) (0.06) (0.03)  p-value (0.46) (0.01) (0.00) 
15-month Nonclean Clean Non-Clean-Clean  15-month Big 4 Local Local-Big4 
β -0.061 -0.055 0.007  β -0.038 -0.055 0.017 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
CRPTs       
12-month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 
β 0.006 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 
p-value (0.90) (0.73) (0.53) (0.60) (0.55) (0.04) 
15-month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 
β -0.015 -0.019 -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 -0.009 
p-value (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
State Ownership         
12-month Private SOE SOE-Private Local SOE Central SOE local-private central-private central-local 
β 0.017 -0.006 -0.023 -0.001 -0.026 -0.018 -0.044 -0.032 
p-value (0.80) (0.46) (0.00) (0.60) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
15-month Private SOE SOE-Private Local SOE Central SOE local-private central-private central-local 
β 0.001 -0.027 -0.027 -0.022 -0.045 -0.022 -0.046 -0.024 
p-value (0.36) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liquidity         
12-month  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1  
β  -0.021 -0.011 0.003 0.005 0.022 0.043  
p-value  (0.14) (0.25) (0.68) (0.87) (0.53) (0.00)  
15-month  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1  
β  -0.047 -0.023 -0.014 -0.014 0.009 0.055  
p-value  (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.30) (0.00)  
See Tables 5-9 for the definitions of OPAQUE, Audit Opinion, Audit Firm, CRPT, State Ownership, and Liquidity. 
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Table 11 Sentiment Effects and an Aggregated Measure of Transparency 
     
9-month Low medium high High-low 
β -0.079 -0.071 -0.051 0.027 
p-value (0.06) (0.11) (0.27) 0.00 
     
12-month Low medium high High-low 
β -0.143 -0.129 -0.112 0.030 
p-value (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
     
15-month Low medium high High-low 
β -0.173 -0.159 -0.143 0.031 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
We construct a simple composite index for firm-level transparency by summing up the scores of six 
transparency variables. OPAQUEit_score (CRPTit_score) = 1 if OPAQUE (CRPT) in firm i is below the 
median at year t, otherwise 0. LIQit_score = 1 if firm i’s stock turnover is above the median at year t, 
otherwise 0. Auditfirmit_score = 1 if firm i is audited by one of the Big 4 and 0 if firm i is audited by a 
local auditor at year t. AuditOPit_score = 1 if firm i receives a unqualified audit opinion at year t, 
otherwise 0. SOEit_score = 1 if firm i is a privately controlled firm and 0 if firm i is a state-owned firm. 
Based on the firm’s aggregate score, we partition them into three equal-weighted portfolios (low, 
medium, high) and report the coefficients on SENT for equal-weighted portfolios. High refers to more 
transparent firms. Regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the 
market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL), and the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, and HML). 
 
∑ [RETt+k]Kk=1  = α + β SENT t + γ1 EP t + γ2 RF t + γ3 INFL t + γ4 MKT t + γ5 SMB t + γ6 HMLt + ε t+k 
 
Simulated p-values are in parentheses and are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient β ≠ 0. 
 
 
